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Abstract 
We examine the impact of a unilateral carbon tax in developed countries focusing on the 
expected size of carbon leakage (an increase in emissions in non-taxing regions as a 
result of the tax) and the effects on leakage of border tax adjustments. We start by 
analyzing the problem using a simple two-country, three-good general equilibrium model 
to develop intuitions. We then simulate the expected size of the effects using a new, 
open-source, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. We analyze the extent of 
emissions reductions from a carbon tax in countries that made commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol (Annex B countries), the expected carbon leakage, and the effects of 
border tax adjustments on carbon leakage, all relative to our baseline projections for 
emissions. We also perform extensive sensitivity tests on the parameters of the CGE 
model. Finally, we consider the effects of imperfect border tax adjustments on leakage, 
such as global or regional schedules of border taxes.  
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The Framework Convention on Climate Change envisions a process 
whereby developed nations commit to reducing their emission of greenhouse 
gases before developing nations take similar steps.1 Following this vision, the 
Kyoto protocol currently only binds 37 nations to targets on their emissions.2
While there are a number of important motivations for this approach, there 
are two central concerns. The first is whether a carbon price that exempts 
developing nations can sufficiently reduce global emissions. The developing 
world is expected to be a major source of emissions in the future. Even if the 
developed world were to cut its emissions drastically, atmospheric carbon dioxide 
would not be stabilized by this action alone. 
 No 
fast-growing developing nation faces emission limitations. 
The second concern is that if only developed nations impose carbon 
controls, emissions in the developing world might go up, offsetting any 
reductions, in a phenomenon known as carbon leakage. Carbon leakage is thought 
to arise for two reasons. First, if only a subset of nations impose controls on 
emissions of carbon dioxide, energy-intensive production may flee to regions 
without controls. Second, if nations with carbon controls use fewer fossil fuels, 
the price of fossil fuels may go down, resulting in more use in other regions. 
Carbon leakage has the potential to defeat the purpose of having carbon controls, 
inefficiently shift the location of production and energy use, and create domestic 
political challenges.  
Carbon leakage has been a central worry in negotiations regarding an 
international climate change treaty and in the design of existing emissions control 
systems. For example, the United States has maintained that the possibility of 
carbon leakage makes it undesirable and possibly futile for it to impose carbon 
controls while major developing countries do not.3
                                                 
1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107. 
 The major developing 
countries, however, insist that the United States (and other developed countries) 
must act first to reduce emissions, in accordance with their agreement under the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The result has been an impasse. The 
European Union on the other hand has imposed a unilateral carbon price but 
2 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 
11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.  
3 See Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted) (“[T]he Senate 
strongly believes that the proposals under negotiation, because of the disparity of treatment 
between Annex I Parties and Developing Countries and the level of required emission reductions, 
could result in serious harm to the United States economy.”). 
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constructed the system to prevent leakage by providing subsidies to trade-exposed 
industry.4
 We analyze the effects of a carbon tax in the developed world and the 
resulting carbon leakage. Our focus is on the legal and institutional design choices 
that affect carbon leakage with the goal of understanding how to design an 
administrable and legal regional carbon tax that most effectively reduces carbon 
emissions. For example, we consider whether the location of the collection of the 
tax in the production cycle (i.e., upstream or downstream) can affect leakage, how 
much border tax adjustments change leakage, and whether administrative or legal 
restrictions on the types of border tax adjustments that can be used will change 
these conclusions. 
 The result is a less efficient pricing system.  
Our analysis relies on two different, although related, tools. We use an 
analytic general equilibrium model of trade to develop an understanding of the 
problem and the likely effects. We then use a new, computable general 
equilibrium model of the global economy, CIM-EARTH, to assess the likely size 
of the effects and their sensitivity to assumptions.5
 Our emphasis is on understanding the structure of the problem and the 
sensitivity of the effects to modeling assumptions and parameters. Simulations of 
the sort produced here will always have substantial uncertainties. For those who 
want bottom line results, however, we can report the following, with appropriate 
caveats. In our simulations, a carbon tax in the Kyoto Protocol Annex B nations 
(which roughly make up the developed world) will produce only about one-third 
of the reductions of a global tax. Leakage, however, is only a modest part of the 
story. Our central measures for leakage under a carbon tax in Annex B, defined as 
the increase in emissions in the non-taxing region as a fraction of emissions 
reductions in the taxing region, are in the 15-25 percent range. Most of the 
reduced emissions in switching from an Annex B tax to a global tax arise because 
a global tax will help control the increase in non-Annex B countries which is 
expected to occur even without leakage. 
  
                                                 
4 See Pricing Carbon: The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (A. Denny 
Ellerman, Frank J. Converty and Christian De. Perthuis (eds)( 2010) and David Weisbach, Carbon 
Taxation in the EU: Expanding the EU Carbon Price, Environmental Law Review (2012), doi: 
10.1093/jel/eqr033, for discussions of the design of the EU system. 
5 There is a substantial prior literature analyzing carbon leakage, most of it using CGE 
models. Other literature analyzes special cases using analytic general (or sometimes partial) 
equilibrium models. Part 2 contains an extensive attempt at replicating the results of prior CGE 
models; the relevant work is cited there.. 
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 We also simulate the effects of border tax adjustments, taxes on the 
emissions from the production of an imported good and rebates of domestic 
carbon taxes on the export of goods. Border tax adjustments are thought to reduce 
leakage because they reduce the incentive to shift production abroad. In our 
simulations, border tax adjustments reduce leakage substantially. They result in an 
increase in emissions in the taxing region and a reduction in the non-taxing 
region, relative to a production tax. This finding is consistent with our 
understanding of the reasons why leakage occurs, which we discuss below. 
 Finally, we simulate the effects of an imperfect border tax system. Border 
tax adjustments are complex to administer because they require the importing 
country to determine the emissions from the production of a good produced 
abroad. Knowledge of the particular and constantly changing production 
processes and energy sources in other countries may not be available. Moreover, 
there may be legal concerns with some types of border taxes because of the 
relevant WTO rules. Therefore, we consider presumptive border tax adjustments 
under which there are schedules of the appropriate border tax adjustments for 
different types of goods. We compare presumptive schedules of this sort to 
perfect border tax adjustments. In our simulations, presumptive schedules are not 
as effective as perfect border taxes. The imperfect systems we simulate result in 
roughly double the leakage arising from perfect border taxes, although the size of 
the differences vary based on the type of system and the tax rate. We do not 
attempt to measure the savings in administrative costs; presumptive schedules 
may be superior, all things considered.  
Before turning to the analysis, it is worth a brief detour to discuss our 
methodology. Large computational models, particularly computable general 
equilibrium models such as the model used here, are not commonly found in the 
legal literature. Even the most advanced computational models are thought to be 
too crude to capture legal reasoning, which is a mixture of analogical reasoning, 
the close reading of statutes, knowledge of history, and an understanding of how 
legal rules fit within a given social, legal, and institutional structure. Moreover, 
sufficiently advanced computation may not be sufficiently transparent and might 
depend critically on the model structure and available data.  
 Law and economics seeks to understand the effects of legal rules through 
the use of economic methodology. It is a forward looking, pragmatic quest for 
solutions to legal problems. We view computation as a potential tool for law and 
economics to gain insights into the likely effects of legal rules and the design of 
institutions. In the present case, for example, analytic models and econometric 
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techniques, both widely used in law and economics, are unlikely to be able to give 
a sense of the magnitude of carbon leakage, to analyze the size of the effects of 
border tax adjustments, and to compare perfect border taxes with imperfect border 
taxes. We can study all of these issues with a computational model. For example, 
by comparing perfect and imperfect border taxes, we are able to consider the 
effect of a possible WTO ruling on the issue in ways that cannot easily be done 
through more traditional methods. 
 We address the criticisms of computation in four ways. First, we use an 
analytic model to generate economic intuitions and hypotheses, much like studies 
which rely solely on analytic models. We think of the analytic model as a “model 
of the model.” If the results produced by the computational model are not 
consistent with the predictions of the analytic model, we can then go back to try to 
understand the underlying economic forces. Combining analytic and 
computational models allows us to gain insights into the problem that might be 
less accessible if we considered only numerical simulations. Computation 
becomes an addition to rather than a substitute for conventional legal and 
economic reasoning. It becomes a way of estimating the likely magnitude of the 
effects that we expect to see from the analytic model and a way of testing the 
robustness of the analytic model to more complex specifications.6
Second, we make our code open source, downloadable from our website.
 
7 
All of our code and model assumptions can be examined by anyone.8
                                                 
6 Ken Judd discusses the complementarity between computational and analytic models as 
follows. Analytic models must make strong simplifying assumptions but are able to establish 
proofs of results within their limited domain. Computational models are able to sample from a 
much larger space but can only show results from the particular points which are sampled. The 
two together help get a fuller understanding of an issue than either could alone. Kenneth L. Judd, 
Computationally Intensive Analysis in Economics, Handbook of Computational Economics 
Introduction to the Handbook in Computational Economics (Leigh Tesfatsion and Kenneth L. 
Judd (eds) (2006).  
 We 
encourage replication of our results and testing them for robustness to alternative 
specifications. 
7 Center for Robust Decision making on Climate and Energy Policy (RDCEP) web site, 
www.rdcep.org  
8 Our model is currently implemented in the AMPL programming language, which 
requires a license. In addition, we use Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) data, which must be 
purchased (at modest cost). Therefore, unfortunately, actually running our code is not free, 
although anyone may obtain the necessary licenses. While we plan to switch to an open-source 
software system, GTAP data is by far the most comprehensive data, and there does not appear to 
be a viable alternative. Nevertheless, the underlying code and all of its assumptions can be freely 
examined.  
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Third, we test the robustness of the model results to our parameter choices. 
We consider how the results change when central parameters change, both alone 
and in combination. We present some of these results here and document 
additional tests on our website.  
Finally, we attempt to replicate prior studies of the problem within our 
model. While we cannot replicate the precise model structures used in prior 
studies, we can use their parameter choices in our model. Doing so helps show 
whether differences in model results are due to different parameter choices, model 
structures, or other unspecified factors. 
The result, we hope, shows the potential for using computation to address 
legal problems. While computation is not suited to all legal problems, in many 
cases computation can be valuable in understanding the expected effects of a legal 
rule as an addition to the usual ways of gaining understanding.  
This paper comes in two parts. Part 1 discusses the analytic model. We 
present the basic assumptions of the model and then describe the intuitions behind 
the solution. The mathematical statement of the model and derivation of the 
solution is available on our website. We also provide a numerical simulation of 
the results using parameters derived from the data we use in our CGE model. The 
simulation allows us to show the solutions graphically and to see the sensitivity of 
the results to the central parameters. Part II focuses on CIM-EARTH. The 
documentation for CIM-EARTH is provided on our website and we do not cover 
the details here. After giving a brief background on the model structure, we 
describe several elements of CIM-EARTH that are central to this study: the 
treatment of trade, our data sources, and our parameter estimates. We then present 
our results from CIM-EARTH, show their sensitivity to central parameter choices, 
and attempt to replicate the results from prior studies of carbon leakage. 
1. Analytic model of carbon taxation 
 As noted, the standard view is that there are two causes of leakage.9
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Niven Winchester, Sergey Paltsev, and John M. Reilly, Will Border Carbon 
Adjustments Work?, 11 B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Article 7 (2011).  
 First, 
when only one part of the world taxes emissions, energy-intensive production 
shifts from the taxing region to the non-taxing region; shifting energy-intensive 
production to the non-taxing region avoids the tax. Second, because the tax 
reduces energy use in the taxing regions, overall energy prices may fall, creating 
an incentive for greater energy use (and emissions) in the non-taxing region. In 
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this section, we use a simple model to consider how these effects arise under 
different types of taxes. 
Model structure and assumptions. Consider a world with only two regions 
or countries: Home, which imposes a tax on emissions and Foreign, which does 
not. Each country has a pool of labor, L and L*, and fossil fuel deposits E and E* 
(where variables with asterisks denote Foreign). Assume that these factors cannot 
be traded: there is no migration and fossil fuel deposits are in the ground.10
 Some goods, such as services, can be produced solely with labor. We call 
these goods collectively the labor-good or l-good. The production of other goods, 
which we call the energy-intensive-good or ei-good, needs energy. To create 
energy, the deposits have to be extracted.
 
11
 Our goal is to understand how trade affects emissions. (If there were no 
trade at all, Foreign activity would not be affected by a Home carbon tax.) To this 
end, assume that all goods – energy, the l-good and the ei-good – are traded 
costlessly. This means that there is a single global price of energy, a single global 
price of the l-good, and a single global wage rate.
 The resulting energy, such as coal or 
gas, is then used in production, in combination with labor, to produce the ei-good. 
Emissions are created when the energy is used, and we assume that emissions are 
proportional to energy use. We do not model damages from emissions. 
12 To differentiate foreign and 
domestic production, we assume that Home and Foreign varieties of the ei-good 
are different and that consumers prefer their local variety; there is a home bias. 
(The l-good and energy, however, are homogenous.)13
                                                 
10 This means that we assume deposits cannot be purchased. Bard Harstad, Buy Coal? 
Deposit Markets and Environmental Policy, forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy (2012), 
considers the effects of a market for deposits.  
 Therefore, there is an ei-
good and an ei*-good each of which can be traded.  
11 Extraction, in our model, has increasing marginal costs. Marginal costs will be 
increasing if, for example, the deposits with the lowest extraction cost are used first, then more 
expensive deposits, and so forth. 
12 We consider only equilibria in which each country produces some of the l-good, a 
condition that is easily checked given the parameters of the model. 
13 To keep the model simple, we use Cobb-Douglas production functions and utility 
functions. These take the form (1 ) ,Q X Yγ γ−= where γ is the share spent on X in production or 
consumption (depending on what the function is representing) and (1-γ) is the share of Y. Because 
we use Cobb-Douglas functions, the relative spending shares of goods, both in production and 
consumption are fixed. This limits the analysis somewhat.  
Note that the model we used in an earlier version of the paper is a special case of the 
current model. See Joshua Elliott, Ian Foster, Sam Kortum, Todd Munson, Fernando Cervantes 
Perez and David Weisbach, Trade and Carbon Taxes, 100 American Economic Review 465-69 
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 We will consider three tax systems in Home as well as a global tax. The 
first, which we call a production tax, is imposed on Home use of energy in 
production. The second, which we call a BTA tax, is a production tax with border 
tax adjustments. The border tax adjustments are (1) a tax on embedded carbon in 
imports in the ei*-good; and (2) a rebate of production taxes previously paid on 
the ei-good when it is exported.14 Together, these two aspects of border tax 
adjustments mean that there is a tax on home consumption of ei-type goods and 
no tax on foreign consumption of ei-type goods. We can, therefore, think of a 
BTA tax as a tax on the carbon content of consumption in Home (as compared to 
a tax on production in Home under a production tax). The final tax is a tax on the 
extraction of fossil fuels.15
 
 We can think of the extraction tax as an upstream tax, 
the production tax as a mid-stream tax, and the BTA tax as a fully downstream 
tax. Figure 1 presents a picture of the model structure. (The core model equations 
are presented in the Appendix.) 
Figure 1: Structure of the Analytic model 
                                                                                                                                     
(May 2010). The key differences are that in our prior work, there was no home bias in 
consumption and there was no separate production process to convert energy into a consumption 
good. Setting the relevant parameters correctly converts the model used here into that model. 
14 The rebate in our model is based on the aggregate energy use in production of the ei-
good. If there were individual firms, they would take this rebate (per unit produced) as given. This 
approach avoids the problem of firms using dirty technology for export and clean technology for 
domestic use.  
15 We need not separately consider an extraction tax with border adjustments as this is 
equivalent to a production tax. 
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No-tax case. If there are no taxes, the analysis is straightforward. The 
countries produce energy in proportion to their relative endowments; the country 
with the greater endowment will extract more, up to the point at which marginal 
extraction costs are equated across countries. This efficiency condition arises 
because extraction has increasing marginal costs, energy is traded so there is a 
single global price, and labor costs are the same in both countries. The location of 
energy use, however, is not related to extraction. Instead, because energy is 
traded, its use depends on the relative demand for each country’s variety of the ei-
good. The country facing higher demand for its energy-intensive products will use 
more energy. The direction of net trade in energy can go either way as the country 
with greater deposits could have even greater relative energy demand.  
Production tax. A production tax in Home creates a wedge between the 
world energy price and the cost of energy as an input to produce the ei-good. To 
some extent, the tax can be absorbed by using less energy in the production of the 
ei-good. But after this, the price of the ei-good has to go up. As a result, 
consumers in both countries will substitute away from the Home variety of the ei-
good. Overall, emissions in Home (which come from the production of the ei-
good) fall both because of less energy use in production and because of fewer 
global purchases of the Home variety of the ei-good.  
The effects in Foreign are essentially the reverse of the effects in Home. 
Less energy is used in Home due to the tax, which means that the price of energy 
falls. The use of energy in the production of the ei*-good, therefore, is cheaper. To 
some extent, production of the ei*-good will be more energy-intensive and to 
some extent the price of the ei*-good will fall. As a result, consumers around the 
world demand more of the ei*-good, resulting in greater production and emissions 
in the foreign country. There is a production-location effect and an energy-price 
effect, corresponding to the two types of leakage noted in the literature.  
 A key parameter in determining the extent of leakage is the amount by 
which the supply of energy falls due to the decline in the price of energy resulting 
from the tax: the price elasticity of energy supply.16
                                                 
16 This approach is consistent with other analytic models of leakage. See Hans-Werner 
Sinn, Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach, 15 Int’l tax and Public 
Finance 360-394 (2008); Harstad, Buy Coal, note 10. 
 If the supply is completely 
insensitive to price, total energy production remains the same even with a carbon 
tax. We get 100% leakage. This might be a world where the marginal source of 
energy is Saudi Arabia (i.e., with oil that can be extracted at a low cost) and Saudi 
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Arabia simply pumps out the same amount of oil regardless of the price.17
 BTA tax. Consider how the results change if we add border tax 
adjustments. We can think of a production tax with border tax adjustments as 
falling on Home consumption of ei-type goods (i.e., both the ei-good and the ei*-
good). As a result, Home consumption of ei-type goods of both varieties goes 
down. The reduction in demand in Home means that overall less energy is used to 
satisfy Home demand, resulting in a lower price of energy. The price of both ei-
type goods goes down in Foreign which raises demand for them there. Finally, 
production of the ei-good becomes less energy intensive while production of the 
ei*-good becomes more energy intensive. 
 A 
carbon tax has no effect on emissions; it just reduces the rents received by energy 
producers. At the other extreme, if the quantity of energy produced is highly 
sensitive to the price, leakage will be low. We might think of this world as one 
where the marginal source of energy is Canadian tar sands (i.e., the energy is 
difficult and expensive to produce so small decreases in the price of energy can 
lead to large reductions in production). Leakage can approach zero because the 
tax reduces energy supply with little reduction in the energy price. 
 The net effects are driven to a large extent by the degree of home bias. 
Consumers in Home prefer their variety of the ei-good, so when they decrease 
their demand for all ei-type goods, the effect falls more heavily on Home 
production. Similarly, Foreign consumers prefer their variety of the good, so 
when they increase their demand, more of the additional production takes place in 
Foreign. The result is emissions reductions in Home, and emissions increases in 
Foreign. Globally, there is a net reduction in emissions but there is still leakage 
under the BTA tax.18
The source of leakage in the production tax case and the border tax case is 
different. In the production tax case, leakage arises because of the increased 
global demand for the ei*-good and because of the increased energy-intensity in 
Foreign production used to meet that demand. In the BTA tax case, leakage arises 
from increased Foreign demand for both varieties of the ei-good and the fact that 
much of that demand will be met by Foreign production (and because production 
there becomes more energy intensive). 
 
                                                 
17 It is not easy to characterize Saudi Arabia’s strategy and we just use it as a placeholder 
example without making specific claims about its production choices.  
18 We know there is a global reduction in emissions because the tax directly hits Home 
consumption while foreign consumption goes up only through the indirect effect of the tax on 
energy prices which is tempered by shifts in the energy-intensity of production.  
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The effect of the elasticity of energy supply is similar in both the 
production tax and BTA tax cases, however: a low elasticity increases leakage. 
The reason is that in both cases, a low elasticity of energy supply means that 
supply does not go down much in response to the tax; instead the tax is absorbed 
into the pre-tax world energy price. The lower world energy price (and relatively 
fixed supply of energy) results in increased production of ei-type goods in 
Foreign.  
Extraction tax. The final tax we consider is an extraction tax in Home. The 
extraction tax lowers the after-tax price received by Home energy producers. The 
resulting decrease in Home energy supply raises the global price of energy, 
creating an incentive for more extraction abroad. Because of the unified global 
price of energy, ei-type production in the two countries faces the same change: an 
overall higher price of energy. Production will become more labor intensive and 
global demand for ei-type goods of both varieties will go down. The location of 
the production declines could be in either country.  
To illustrate the effects, imagine that all of the energy deposits were in 
Home. Then all energy producers will bear the extraction tax resulting in reduced 
supply and a decline in its use in production of ei-type goods. The decline will be 
in both countries, with the share of the decline depending on the relative global 
demand for each variety of the ei-good. If there are energy deposits in Foreign as 
well, then an increase in extraction there offsets the reduction in extraction in 
Home, but does not affect where the ei-type good production declines occur. If all 
deposits are in Foreign, of course the extraction tax has no effect. The 
effectiveness of an extraction tax depends on having a substantial portion of fuel 
deposits being covered. 
In a strict sense, an extraction tax generates no leakage in that foreign 
energy use does not go up. It will, in fact, go down because of the global increase 
in energy costs. Nevertheless, we can think of there being leakage in the sense 
that foreign activity – here extraction of additional deposits – partially offsets the 
effects of the tax in Home. Leakage in this sense goes up with the supply 
elasticity, which is in contrast to the effects of the supply elasticity on leakage (in 
the production sense) under production and BTA taxes. 
We can, therefore, think of an extraction tax as an alternative and quite 
different type of tax than a production or BTA tax. It works by raising the price of 
energy, which if energy is traded, is a global phenomenon. In contrast, a 
production tax raises the price of energy use in a particular location and a 
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production tax with border tax adjustments raises the price of consumption in a 
particular location. If leakage is a serious concern, an extraction tax might be 
attractive. The downside is that an extraction tax is only effective if a substantial 
portion of global deposits are covered or if the supply in non-taxed regions is 
inelastic.19
Global tax. The most desirable policy would be one that harmonizes 
carbon policy around the world. If both countries impose a tax (of the same kind 
and at the same rate), the distinctions between the different types of taxes largely 
disappears. Production and extraction taxes create the same wedge between the 
cost of energy as an input and the price received by those who extract energy. 
There is, as a result, a shift toward more labor-intensive production of ei-type 
goods and an increase in the price of those goods. Similarly, a BTA tax and a 
production tax have the same effects on prices, production, and consumption. 
  
The key difference between the three types of taxes under a global tax 
system is the allocation of the tax revenue. Under an extraction tax, the country 
where the extraction takes place gets the revenue; under a production tax, the 
country where production takes place gets the revenue; and under the BTA tax, 
the country where consumption takes place gets the revenue. As a result, the 
choice of taxes may have distributional effects. Note that these effects can be 
offset through transfer payments between the countries. 
Simulations. To get a sense of the predictions of our analytic model, we 
parameterized it to roughly coincide with the data we use for our CGE model. We 
then run simulations to test the sensitivity of results to changes in the central 
variables. 
Figure 2 shows effects of the three taxes we study on emissions. The 
global tax reduces global emissions around twice as much as a production tax 
(i.e., a tax only Home). This result can be seen by comparing the top and bottom 
lines. We can get a visual sense of leakage by comparing Home reductions under 
a production tax and global reductions under the same tax. The higher global 
emissions (smaller reductions) are due to the increase in Foreign emissions 
because of the tax, which is leakage. Finally, if we add border taxes, global 
emissions go down relative to a production tax; it appears that leakage is smaller.  
                                                 
19 Many deposits are located outside of Annex B countries, possibly making an extraction 
tax less effective than other taxes, at least if non-Annex B countries are not to be subject to 
emissions restrictions and supply is price elastic. Harstad, Buy Coal, note 10, suggests that the 
taxing countries can make the supply in non-taxing countries price inelastic by purchasing 
reserves held by non-taxing countries. 
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Figure 2: Effects of various taxes on emissions in analytic model 
Figure 3 focuses on the effects of border taxes. Like Figure 2, it shows the 
global emissions reductions under a Home production tax, Home reductions under 
that tax, and global reductions under a border tax system. It adds a line showing 
Home reductions when there are border taxes. Home emissions go up when we 
add a border tax (comparing the bottom two lines). If climate treaties are based on 
emissions targets for different regions, border taxes will actually make the target 
more difficult to reach in Home.  
Border taxes reduce leakage in this model. We define the leakage rate as 
the increase in global emissions relative to reduction in emissions in the taxing 
region under a given tax.20
                                                 
20 Formally, if a region x imposes a tax, leakage is (ΔemisisonsWorld -
Δemissionsx)/Δemissionsx. This means that leakage under a global tax is defined to be zero 
(because the numerator is always zero). This does not mean, however, that there are no changes in 
the location of production or consumption under a global tax which may be of interest to policy-
makers. 
 With border taxes, it is based on the difference 
between the middle two lines in Figure 3. Relative to a production tax, border 
taxes increase Home emissions and reduce global emissions, and both effects 
contribute to a reduction in the leakage rate. 
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Figure 3: Emissions under Production and BTA taxes 
Figure 4 shows the effect of the elasticity of energy supply on leakage for 
the production and BTA taxes with a tax rate of about $29/ton of CO2. The upper 
line is the production tax; the lower line the BTA tax. As we can see, leakage is 
lower under the BTA tax. Both taxes, however, respond similarly to the supply 
elasticity and as the elasticity approaches zero, leakage becomes high in both 
cases. As the elasticity goes up, leakage goes down, and in fact becomes slightly 
negative with border taxes.21
                                                 
21 Negative leakage appears to arise because Home is the dominant consumer of the ei*-
good, and its demand goes down. If the elasticity of energy supply is large enough, this effect 
dominates the energy price decline (which stimulates Foreign production). A recent paper shows 
that leakage can be negative if (1) the output of the untaxed sector or region is not a perfect 
substitute for the output of the taxed sector, (2) the taxed sector or region can reduce carbon per 
unit of output, and (3) capital or labor are mobile between sectors or regions. See Don Fullerton, 
Daniel Karney, and Kathy Baylis, Negative Leakage, working paper, (2011) (available at: 
http://works.bepress.com/don_fullerton/61Fullerton et al). Under those conditions, they show that 
the sector or region facing the carbon tax might reduce carbon per unit of output by using 
resources drawn away from the other sector or region, shrinking that other sector’s output and 
emissions. That mechanism is not operational here, however, because we have assumed that the 
tax on carbon applies to all Home sectors, while neither labor nor capital are mobile 
internationally. If our model were to satisfy those three conditions, then leakage might be lower. 
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Figure 4: Leakage as a function of energy supply elasticity 
We can examine changes in production and consumption in more detail 
through what we call carbon matrices. We present these results in Table 1, which 
shows changes from the no-tax case for an $11/ton tax on CO2. The rows 
represent production. For example, the top row is Home energy use in production. 
The columns represent consumption. The first column in the first row is the 
energy use for Home production of goods consumed domestically. The second 
column in the first row is the energy use for goods produced in Home and 
exported to (and consumed in) Foreign. The last column is total production in 
each country. The bottom row is total consumption in each region. 
We can see in the case of the production tax that Home energy use in 
production goes down more than Home consumption while Foreign energy use in 
production goes up, illustrating carbon leakage. Foreign consumption actually 
goes down because of the substantial decrease in imports of the ei-good. If we add 
border tax adjustments, there is a large drop in Foreign production (relative to the 
production tax case) for export to Home. Total Foreign production goes down. 
Production tax 
   
BTA tax 
    Home Foreign Prod. 
 
  Home Foreign Prod. 
Home -42.9% -44.2% -43.1% 
 
Home -42.9% -36.0% -41.4% 
Foreign 10.3% 7.9% 9.2% 
 
Foreign -2.1% 8.7% 2.9% 
Cons. -26.0% -8.7% -21.0% 
 
Cons. -29.6% -5.6% -22.6% 
Table 1: Carbon matrices in snalytic model 
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One surprising result from the analytic model is the comparison of the 
global welfare effects of the production and BTA taxes. We can compare these 
effects by setting the tax rate so that emissions are the same under the two 
policies. If emissions are the same, we can ignore the damages from emissions (as 
they will be the same under either policy) and simply consider welfare from 
consumption.  
Set the tax rates so that emissions are the same under a production tax 
system and a BTA tax and consider each country’s income. There are only two 
sources of income: labor and returns from exploiting energy deposits. The total 
labor is fixed and its wage is always 1 in the model, so to measure income, we 
need only consider the returns from exploiting energy deposits. If emissions are 
the same under the two tax systems, the total deposits extracted must be the same. 
If the same deposits are extracted in the two scenarios, the price of energy is also 
the same. That is, if we set the tax rates so that emissions are the same under a 
production tax and a BTA tax, the returns from exploiting deposits will be the 
same. Overall income is unchanged (except for the tax revenues received by 
Home).  
Foreign’s income is the same under the production tax and the BTA tax. 
Climate damages are the same. This means that we can analyze its welfare solely 
by reference to how much individuals there can consume. With the production 
tax, foreign consumption of the Home-variety of the ei-good includes the tax 
while under the BTA tax, it does not. Consumers in Foreign can consume more 
under the BTA tax. Therefore, they are better off with border taxes.  
Analysis of Home is more complex. If we leave aside tax revenue, it is 
clear that Home is worse off with border taxes for the same reasons that Foreign 
is better off. Tax revenue, however, means that Home’s income may not be the 
same in the two cases. If tax revenues are lower when there are border taxes, then 
Home is worse off. If tax revenues are higher, we have to weigh the additional 
income against the higher cost of goods, so whether Home is better or worse off 
will depend on the parameters. 
These results about welfare are contrary to standard intuitions which hold 
that the taxing regions will want to impose border taxes and the non-taxing 
regions will oppose them. U.S. climate change legislation regularly includes 
measures to protect domestic industries while developing countries strenuously 
object to these measures. The simple model is not capturing something going on 
in the world that motivates political preferences over these policies. 
Carbon taxes and trade, Draft of 2/10/12  16 
 
We have three hypotheses about what these motivations are. The first is 
that views about border taxes are informed by flawed mercantilist thinking, and 
that if analysts focused on consumer welfare they would agree with the results of 
our model. Second, our model abstracts from considerations of good or bad jobs 
or unemployment. The wage is always 1 regardless of where individuals work. 
There are also no producer profits. If for some reason wages vary across 
industries (in ways not related to worker productivity), there could be reasons for 
preferring one system or the other. Finally, our model does not have adjustment 
costs. It might be the case that in the long run the results of our model would 
obtain but it is not easy to take a steel worker and turn him into a nurse. To the 
extent there are efficiency wages (or similar effects) or transition costs, these 
effects should temper our result, but we would still expect the effects we see in 
the model to occur in the real world. 
2. CGE Modeling of Leakage 
 Given the understanding of the issue from the analytic model, we can test 
the results in our CGE model and also assess the likely size of the effects. We 
present the results from this effort here beginning with background on the model. 
 2.1. CIM-EARTH structure 
 The detailed structure of CIM-EARTH is described in its documentation, 
and we refer interested readers there.22
As in all CGE models, individuals own labor and capital, which they 
provide to industry in exchange for wages and rents. They use this income to 
purchase goods and to save so as to maximize their utility. In the current version 
of the model, labor supply is fixed – consumers do not respond to carbon taxes by 
working less. In addition, individuals are not forward looking, in that they do not 
anticipate the future; they save because it brings them utility.  
 We describe here the basic structure of the 
model, how trade is treated, and our data sources. While the model is detailed and 
complex, in many ways it remains greatly simplified. Some, and perhaps many, of 
the simplifications can be justified as removing unnecessary complexity, but 
because some may affect the results, it is important to be aware of the major 
simplifications we make. We highlight them here.  
                                                 
22 www.rdcep.org and Joshua Elliott, Ian Foster, Kenneth Judd, Elisabeth Moyer, and 
Todd Munson, CIM-EARTH: Framework and Case Study, The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis 
& Policy: Vol. 10: Issue 2 (Symposium), Article 11 (2010).  
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Industry hires labor, rents capital, and buys intermediate inputs, which it 
combines to create goods. The industry structure is designed to mimic how goods 
actually flow in our economy. For example, the energy sector uses labor, energy, 
capital, and deposits to extract energy which is then sold to industries (including 
the energy industry itself) and households. That is, industry output can be 
intermediate goods used by other industries or final goods used by consumers. 
The intermediate goods are used by industries to similarly produce a mix of final 
and intermediate goods. Eventually, all output is in the form of final goods 
consumed by individuals or accumulated into stocks of capital.  
Industry production functions use a common flexible functional form 
which allows us to set input shares based on data and allows industries to 
substitute across inputs based on specified elasticities of substitution. Industries 
choose the mix of inputs and outputs to maximize profit. The solution to the 
model involves a set of prices and outputs which makes markets clear in each 
time period. 
The version of the model used for this study has 16 regions and 16 sectors. 
Each sector has a single representative consumer (we do not study distributional 
effects). We present the results of our simulations with fewer regions simply for 
ease of reading; the underlying model is always run with 16 regions and 16 
sectors. The current version of the model has only a single type of capital within 
each region; there are no vintages and capital is perfectly mobile across sectors 
but immobile across regions.23
 Many of the central parameters are exogenous. In particular, labor 
productivity, energy efficiency, land endowment and yield, and resource 
availability are all modeled based on estimates of exogenous trends. As we 
discuss below, we analyze the sensitivity of our results to changes in these 
estimates. We do not, however, attempt to make them endogenous. One 
justification for using exogenous trends is that we view the model as producing 
results for the medium-term, so the tax may not have large effects on business-as-
usual trends. The effects of a regional carbon tax may be much different in the 
long-term as it is both easier to shift production abroad in the long term and, 
 Labor supply is also completely mobile across 
sectors within each region and completely immobile across regions. As noted, we 
do not model the effects of taxes on labor supply: labor supply is determined by 
population growth, which is exogenous. 
                                                 
23 An important implication of this assumption is the there is no foreign direct investment 
in our model. Foreign direct investment may be an important channel of leakage. 
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offsetting this effect, the taxes may substantially influence energy efficiency. It is, 
in future studies, important to make energy efficiency endogenous, particularly 
for studies of longer-term effects. 
 A central component of any study of the effects of trade on carbon 
taxation is how trade is represented in the model. The standard approach in CGE 
models, which we follow, is to treat each region as producing a slightly different 
variety of each good. We treat steel from South Korea as a different commodity 
from steel produced in the United States. Purchasers of the goods have 
preferences over the varieties and will substitute across the varieties depending on 
their prices. These elasticities of substitution are known as the Armington 
elasticities after the inventor of this representation of trade. If the two goods are 
similar – the origin of steel of a given type might not matter – the Armington 
elasticity would be high.24
 The Armington elasticity approach to trade is not based on modern 
theories of trade but can be consistent with them.
 
25
 To complement the Armington representation of trade, we include detail 
on the transport sector. Steel produced in South Korea has to be shipped to the 
United States if it is to be used in the United States. Shipping and other means of 
transport are included in our industry structure as a necessary input into traded 
goods. The transport industry uses energy, so taxes on energy affect transport 
costs.  
 It is highly flexible, and we 
believe it is a reasonable aggregate representation of trade for purposes of 
modeling. As discussed below, we test the sensitivity of our results to differing 
assumptions about the central Armington elasticities.  
 We use data from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP).26
                                                 
24 We use Armington elasticities to measure substitution across imported goods, 
producing what we call an import bundle. The substitution elasticity of this bundle with domestic 
goods is the import elasticity. The import elasticity measures the competitiveness of domestic 
production against imports. In this paper, we generically refer to this entire representation as an 
Armington representation of trade and the overall set of elasticities the Armington elasticities. 
 GTAP is a 
global database with individual country input-output data and bilateral trade and 
transport data. It covers 113 regions and 57 different commodities. We aggregate 
the data into 16 regions and 16 commodities. GTAP collects the data through a 
25 See Costas Arkolakis, Arnaud Costinot, Andres Rodriguez-Clare, New Trade Models, 
Same Old Gains?, 102 American Economic Review 94-130 (2012). 
26 Documentation is available at www.gtap.org  
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global network of governments and researchers. We ran our study using GTAP 7, 
covering the year 2004, which was the most recent version available at the time.  
 The more difficult and problematic data requirement is determining the 
parameters of the model, primarily the substitution elasticities. These elasticities 
determine how firms and individuals respond to changes in prices. For example, 
we want to know how industries will respond if the price of energy goes up, and 
this depends on firms’ ability to substitute away from energy inputs. These 
elasticities cannot be directly observed. They must be estimated. We base our 
elasticities on those used in the MIT CGE model used to evaluate climate policies 
(known as EPPA). MIT obtained these from a literature search and where the 
literature was not available, elicitation from experts in the relevant industry.27
 Before turning to our simulations, we highlight the key differences 
between CIM-EARTH and our analytic model. The core models are designed to 
be similar: the analytic model is essentially a simplified model of CIM-EARTH 
with far less detail, fewer sectors, and so forth. Nevertheless, there are some 
important differences. One is that the analytic model uses Cobb-Douglas 
production and consumption functions, which greatly limits flexibility (because 
spending shares on inputs or consumption are fixed). The CGE model uses a more 
flexible functional form which allows input shares to vary. A second is that the 
analytic model ignores the cost of trading goods so that, absent taxes, the law of 
one price holds internationally. An implication is that factor rewards are also 
equated across countries. In contrast, CIM-EARTH is calibrated to actual bilateral 
trade flows by sector, with costs of trade accounting for differences in import 
shares across countries. A third is that, while the analytic model has only one 
factor of production (labor) that is mobile across sectors, CIM-EARTH also 
incorporates physical capital used in production. Finally, energy is a 
homogeneous good in the analytic model while CIM-EARTH incorporates the 
different carbon content, transport costs, prices, and imperfect substitutability 
between coal, natural gas, and petroleum. This last distinction is particularly 
important as substitution away from coal is one of the main effects of instituting a 
moderate price of carbon.  
 We 
do not have a high level of confidence in these elasticities and, therefore, test the 
sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications. 
                                                 
27 See Mort Webster, Sergey Paltsev, John Parsons, John Reilly, and Henry Jacoby, 
Uncertainty in Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Costs of Atmospheric Stabilization, Report No. 
165, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, November 2008. 
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2.2 Current trade patterns  
Before turning to our simulations, it is helpful to examine existing trade 
patterns. Figure 5 shows the relationship between exposure to trade and the 
energy intensity of production for Annex B.28
Figure 5: Trade Exposure v. Energy Intensity for Annex B 
 Trade exposure is the percent of 
local consumption in Annex B coming from imports from non-Annex B countries. 
Energy intensity is energy use per dollar of revenues for the industry. The size of 
the bubbles is the CO2 emissions. 
None of the products with the highest trade exposure are energy intensive: 
apparel, electronics, and textiles have high trade exposures but require little 
energy to produce. There are no product categories in the upper-right part of the 
figure. Services, which occupy the bottom left corner take little energy to produce 
and are not substantially exposed to trade. The product categories that are most 
likely to be affected by a tax on emissions are in the lower-right quadrant of the 
graph: non-ferrous metals (e.g., aluminum, copper, and titanium), iron and steel, 
chemicals, non-metallic minerals and, perhaps, paper. Non-ferrous metals in 
particular stand out as both energy-intensive and exposed to trade. The transport 
sectors – air, water, and land – are also energy intensive and somewhat exposed to 
                                                 
28 This figure is similar to Figure 1.3 in Trevor Houser et al, Leveling the Carbon Playing 
Field: International Competition and U.S. Climate Policy Design (2008), available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/leveling_the_carbon_playing_field.pdf. We use GTAP 7 data and analyze it for 
Annex B while Houser looks at the United States. Houser shows notably larger import shares than 
we do. We suspect this is because he looks at the United States, while we look at Annex B (so that 
trade within Annex B does not show up as imports).  
Largescale ag 
Sugar 
Textiles 
Leather/apparel 
Wood manufacturing 
Paper 
Chemicals 
Non-metallic Minerals Iron & Steel 
Non-ferrous metals 
Fabricated metal Motor  
vehicle  
manufacturing 
Electronics manufacturing 
Manufacture  
of machinery 
Other  
manufacturing. 
Water 
Land transport 
Water  
transport 
Water transport 
Gov't 
-3% 
2% 
7% 
12% 
17% 
22% 
27% 
-2.5% 2.5% 7.5% 12.5% 17.5% 22.5% 27.5% 
Trade Exposure 
Energy Intensity 
Carbon taxes and trade, Draft of 2/10/12  21 
 
trade. It is not clear, however, whether production in these sectors can shift abroad 
in response to a tax on emissions as their output may be tied to a particular 
locality.  
We can get a better sense of how energy-intensive goods are being traded 
around the globe by considering where imports come from. Table 2 provides the 
share of imports into the United States for five energy-intensive goods by origin. 
Non-Annex-B countries are in gray. Canada dominates the imports of these goods 
and other Annex-B countries also have large shares. The major exception to this 
patterns is cement, where China is the largest importer.  
U.S. Imports by Origin, 2004 
 Iron & Steel Non-ferrous metals Chemicals Paper Cement 
Rank  Source  Share  Source  Share  Source  Share  Source  Share  Source  Share  
1 Canada 14.9 Canada 35.9 Canada 16.0 Canada 55.1 China 15.6 
2 Mexico 9.6 Russia 9.8 Japan 9.4 China 6.4 Italy 12.9 
3 Brazil 9.3 Peru 6.2 China 9.1 Finland 4.4 Canada 11.0 
4 China 7.2 Mexico 5.2 Ireland 8.0 Germany 4.0 Mexico 10.5 
5 Russia 5.7 Brazil 4.8 Germany 7.5 Mexico 3.7 Brazil 6.2 
Table 2: Country of origin for imports to Annex B of energy-intensive goods 
 Finally, we can measure trade in what we call embedded carbon.29
 In particular, standard measures of emissions, including the Framework 
Convention’s mandatory carbon inventories, attribute emissions to the location 
where the greenhouse gas is actually released into the atmosphere. For example, if 
 By 
embedded carbon we mean the carbon emitted in the production of a good, not 
carbon which is physically in the good. To do this, we start with the standard 
measure of emissions, which is based on the physical location of the combustion 
of fossil fuels. We trace how the resulting goods move through the economy and 
attribute the emissions to the places where goods are consumed. The result is a 
matrix which is essentially the same as the matrices we used for the analytic 
model except it covers many regions and is based on actual trade patterns. 
                                                 
29 We follow a prior literature that uses a similar methodology, known as multi-region 
input-output analysis. For a summary of this literature, see T. Wiedmann, A Review of Recent 
Multi-region Input-Output Models used for Consumption-base Emissions and Resource 
Accounting, 68 Ecological Economics 211-222 (2009).  
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fossil fuels are burned in South Korea to produce steel, which is subsequently 
made into an automobile in Japan, and which is shipped to and driven in the 
United States, the Framework Convention attributes the emissions from the steel 
production to South Korea, emissions from the automobile fabrication to Japan, 
and emissions from gasoline combustion to the United States. By knowing the 
inputs to steel production and how steel is traded, and automobile production and 
how automobiles are traded, we can attribute the emissions to the ultimate 
consumers in the United States. 
The GTAP 7 database provides us with input-output tables which tell us 
the inputs into each industry and where the outputs go. Many of the outputs from 
an industry will go to other industries while some will be consumed. The input-
output tables allow us to trace the flow of goods through the economy to their 
final consumption. By tracing fossil fuels through these tables, we can determine 
where goods produced from the combustion of fossil fuels are eventually 
consumed. In the automobile example, we can see that the fossil fuels burned in 
South Korea produce steel which is an input into automobile production in Japan, 
whose output is sold in the United States. Performing this analysis systematically 
on a global basis allows us convert production measures of emissions into 
consumption measures and to see the extent of trade in embedded carbon. 
Table 3 presents our calculations for 2004. Each entry represents 
emissions from production in the region in that row which is then consumed in the 
region in that column, measured in million metric tons of CO2. For example, the 
United States emitted 280 million tons of CO2 to produce goods ultimately 
consumed in the EU. The sum across a row is the total emissions from production. 
in a given region. The sum down a column is the total emissions from 
consumption in a given region.30
                                                 
30 The region labeled JAZ is an aggregate of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. CHK is 
China and South Korea. LAM is all of Latin American including Mexico, the Caribbean, and 
South and Central America, and ROW includes all other non-Annex B regions: Africa, the Middle 
East, and South and Southeast Asia.  
  
Carbon taxes and trade, Draft of 2/10/12  23 
 
  
2004 
Mt CO2 
Annex B Non-Annex B  
US EU RUS JAZ CAN CHK LAM ROW Prod. 
US 5,012 280 7 95 177 109 209 112 6,002 
EU 303 3928 63 72 28 96 66 306 4,863 
RUS 71 408 1,468 22 3 83 22 100 2,178 
JAZ 84 82 3 1,146 8 160 12 98 1,593 
CAN 248 33 1 9 223 12 8 10 543 
CHK 577 587 32 390 50 3,679 103 478 5,897 
LAM 293 122 6 18 16 36 956 40 1,487 
ROW 300 657 31 289 20 376 55 3,199 4,928 
Cons. 6,888 6,096 1,610 2,043 526 4,551 1,432 4,344 27,491 
Net 877 1,235 -566 488 -19 -1,345 -56 -584  
Table 3: Carbon Matrix for 2004, in Mt of CO2 
The standard approach to attributing emissions can be seen by reading 
down the right-most column, which gives emissions from production in each 
region. In 2004, the United States was the largest emitter followed closely by 
China/South Korea (CHK in the table). The EU and ROW (the rest of the world) 
are next. Global emissions were around 27,500 megatons of CO2.31
Consumption figures are in the row labeled Cons. The United States 
consumed 6,888 megatons of CO2 compared to its production of 6002 megatons. 
This means that the United States was a net importer of 877 megatons CO2: the 
goods that it imported had 877 more megatons of embedded CO2 than the goods 
that it exported. The bottom row shows the net imports. The European Union was 
the largest net importer of embedded CO2, with net imports of 1,235 megatons. 
China and South Korea (CHK) are large exporters of CO2, together exporting 
1,345 megatons. Therefore, when we examine emissions on a consumption basis 
rather than a production basis, the developed world has comparatively more 
emissions; the choice by the Framework Convention to allocate emissions based 
on a production measure favors the developed world. 
  
                                                 
31 Note that we use 2004 data because this is the most recent year for the database used in 
our computational model. More recent emissions data are available and can be readily accessed in 
the CAIT database, found at www.cait.wri.org. In 2007, total global emissions were around 
33,500 megatons and China was the largest emitter, producing 6,703 megatons compared to 5,827 
megatons for the United States. The CAIT data is aggregated from IPCC data and other sources. 
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2.3  Business as usual emissions and sensitivity 
 Using CIM-EARTH, we project these current patterns to the future under 
a business as usual (BAU) policy – i.e., assuming no change in carbon policy 
from that already in place. Figure 6 gives our overall simulations of BAU 
emissions and shows how the estimates vary when we vary our assumptions about 
the growth of labor productivity and energy efficiency. The thin gray lines show 
how our estimates change when we change our assumptions about the growth of 
energy-efficiency. The colored groups show how changes in assumptions about 
labor productivity change our results.  
 
Figure 6: Ensemble of model output for a BAU policy scenario and a range of energy efficiency 
and labor productivity assumptions.  
  Figure 7 shows how our results compare to the results of other 
simulations. Our results are higher than the EIA estimates (red) but in the central 
range for the IPCC estimates (light gray lines). 
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Figure 7: Comparison of historical data (blue), 2005-2009 EIA forecasts (red), IPCC scenarios 
(light gray), and baseline for ranges of labor productivity and energy efficiency (black lines). 
 Finally, for each simulation, we can determine which regions are 
producing and consuming CO2 using the same matrix format we used above to 
present the 2004 data. Table 4 provides the breakdown for our central assessment 
of emissions in 2020. Comparing Table 3, we can see that emissions go up by 
59% to 43.8 billion tons. By far the largest expected growth is in emissions from 
China, which we expect to go up by 130%. Russian emissions are expected to go 
up by 85%.  
2020 Annex B Non-Annex B   
Mt CO2 US EU RUS JAZ CAN CHK LAM ROW Prod. 2004 
US 6,583  335 12 117 224 244 268 165 7,951 6,002 
EU 377 4,347 102 80 35 195 81 429 5,648 4,863 
RUS 138 671 2,644 37 6 282 40 215 4,035 2,178 
JAZ 89 85 4 1,266 8 290 14 125 1,852 1,593 
CAN 331 40 1 10 296 29 12 16 738 543 
CHK 1,338 1,298 99 697 121 8,673 228 1,129 13,586 5,897 
LAM 391 148 11 21 20 91 1,273 61 2,020 1,487 
ROW 447 867 59 345 31 930 78 5,198 7,960 4,928 
Cons. 9,697 7,796 2,935 2,543 746 10,736 1,998 7,338 43,791 27,491 
Table 4: Carbon Matrix for 2020 BAU Scenario, central case, in megatons of CO2 
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2.4 Simulations 
We consider a number of different tax simulations. We start by comparing global 
emissions reductions under three different taxes: a global carbon tax, a production 
tax in Annex B countries, and a BTA tax in Annex B countries, all under various 
tax rates. Figure 8 presents our results. (Note that we keep the axes the same as in 
Figure 2 to allow comparison of the analytic model and CIM-EARTH.) 
 
Figure 8: simulation of global emissions reductions under various taxes. 
The figure illustrates three results from the model. The first is that a 
carbon tax only in Annex B, regardless of whether it includes BTAs, has limited 
potential to reduce global emissions. Under our simulations, an Annex B tax will 
reduce emissions by only about ⅓ as much as a global tax. The reason is 
straightforward: most of the growth in emissions is expected to come from non-
Annex B countries. The limited effectiveness of an Annex B tax is not by-and-
large a result of leakage; it is because major sources of emissions are omitted. 
 The second result is that leakage rates are between 15 and 25 percent. We 
can get a visual sense of leakage by comparing the AB reductions under the AB 
tax to the global reductions under the AB tax. The higher global emissions are a 
result of an increase in energy use in non-Annex B countries.  
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 Finally, emissions in CIM-EARTH are far less sensitive to carbon taxes 
than are emissions in the analytic model. This difference can be seen by 
comparing Figure 8 and Figure 2, which show the same scenarios in the two 
models. The analytic model shows reductions of 55 percent for a global carbon 
tax of around $50/ton of CO2 while CIM-EARTH produces only 36 percent 
reductions. The analytic model produces reductions of 28 percent for the 
production tax in Home while CIM-EARTH produces reductions of only 13 
percent for the Annex B tax. 
 We suspect that these differences relate to the ability to substitute away 
from energy in the two models. The analytic model was parameterized so that the 
relative shares of various inputs are roughly the same as in CIM-EARTH. For 
example, relative energy resources in the two regions correspond to the relative 
energy resources in Annex B and non-Annex B countries. The analytic model, 
however, uses a fixed substitution elasticity between energy and labor of 1 due to 
the use of a simplified functional form for which it was possible to obtain a 
closed-form solution to the model. CIM-EARTH sets the equivalent elasticity at 
0.5. This small elasticity makes it more difficult to shift away from energy in 
CIM-EARTH when we add a carbon tax. As a result, we expect lower reductions 
in CIM-EARTH than we see in the analytic model.32
 Figure 9 examines the effects of border taxes. As in the analytic model, 
emissions in Annex B are higher when there are border taxes. To the extent that 
Annex B commits to emissions reductions goals, it is easier to meet them with a 
pure production tax than with BTAs. The reason is that more production shifts to 
non-taxing regions under a production tax.  
 
Comparing global and Annex B reductions under a BTA system shows 
that border taxes reduce leakage substantially. As in the analytic model, this result 
arises because of a reduction in emissions in non-Annex B countries and an 
increase in emissions in Annex B. We can see the increase in Annex B emissions 
by comparing the bottom two lines in Figure 9. The global reductions can be seen 
by comparing the top two lines. Leakage with BTA’s is based on the difference in 
the middle two lines. 
                                                 
32 Preliminary tests of CIM-EARTH using a substitution elasticity between energy and 
capital/labor inputs of 1 show sensitivities similar to those in the analytic model.  
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Figure 9: Reductions in emissions in Annex B countries at a percent of 2020 BAU scenario 
 Examining the carbon matrices provides additional insight. Table 5 gives 
the carbon matrices for an Annex B production tax at $29/ton tax on CO2.33
AB-29 
 The 
numbers are percent changes from the BAU scenario (given in Table 4). 
Annex B Non-Annex B  
v. ref US EU RUS JAZ CAN CHK LAM ROW Prod. 
US -26.9 -18.9 -21.5 -26.1 -21.3 -24.6 -29.4 -28.7 -26.4 
EU -23.7 -23.3 -19.5 -18.3 -17.8 -21.8 -23.4 -28.1 -23.4 
RUS -38.0 -33.8 -29.3 -34.6 -4.0 -37.5 -39.7 -35.6 -31.4 
JAZ -14.5 -14.5 -17.4 -33.0 -18.8 -22.3 -19.3 -25.0 -28.8 
CAN -21.0 -18.9 -16.4 -19.2 -26.1 -20.4 -20.3 -21.0 -22.9 
CHK 1.2 1.7 1.8 2.9 1.9 2.9 2.2 1.2 2.4 
LAM 24.8 13.5 46.7 4.0 25.3 2.8 6.5 5.1 10.8 
ROW 8.2 12.5 18.2 15.0 8.1 6.2 9.4 4.7 6.6 
Cons. -19.0 -15.0 -26.6 -15.5 -16.8 0.3 -1.2 -0.2 -9.9 
Table 5: Percent changes from 2020 BAU for a $29/ton CO2 tax in Annex B 
                                                 
33 We ran our simulations in carbon rather than CO2. Table 5 is for a $105/ton carbon tax, 
which translates to a $28.64/ton tax on carbon dioxide. 
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 The easiest way to read the table is to consider the four large blocks. The 
upper left-hand block is production taking place in Annex B countries consumed 
in those countries. (The diagonal represents production in a given country 
consumed there. The off-diagonal entries are trade within Annex B.) This 
production goes down significantly. The lower left-hand block represents imports 
into Annex B countries from non-Annex B production. As we expect, we see an 
increase in imports: it is relatively less expensive to purchase energy-intensive 
goods produced abroad because of the carbon tax. Similarly, if we look at the 
upper right-hand block, we see a decrease in production in Annex B countries for 
export into non-Annex B countries. It is more difficult for domestic industries to 
compete in the export market.  
 The lower right-hand block is production in non-Annex B countries 
consumed locally. We can see that this goes up, uniformly. The reason is the 
lower price of energy due to decreased use in Annex B. This is the second form of 
leakage discussed above. We can see the net effect by comparing production in 
Annex B countries (the right-hand column) to consumption in Annex B countries 
(the bottom row): production declines by more than consumption, showing 
production leakage. 
 Table 6 presents the carbon matrix for the BTA tax, again showing percent 
changes from our BAU simulations. The key block is the lower left-hand corner 
which shows Annex B imports from non-Annex B countries. This goes from an 
increase in the production tax case to a decrease in the BTA tax case. Border taxes 
reduce the incentive to purchase energy-intensive goods from abroad.  
BTA Annex B Non-Annex B  
v. ref. US EU RUS JAZ CAN CHK LAM ROW Prod. 
US -25.3  -18.0 -20.5 -17.9 -20.0 -23.2 -16.6 -21.4 -21.4 
EU -13.5 -20.2 -17.5 -16.0 -15.7 -25.9 -21.8 -23.2 -20.0 
RUS -31.6 -32.5 -30.3 -29.0 -33.5 -16.4 -19.0 -12.4 -28.6 
JAZ -13.6 -16.0 -16.6 -26.3 -18.8 -25.0 -21.0 -22.3 -19.5 
CAN -15.7 -19.2 -13.7 -18.4 -23.2 -25.0 -21.0 -22.6 -19.5 
CHK -8.0 -9.0 -10.0 -9.9 -10.3 3.1 9.3 5.5 0.3 
LAM -9.6 -2.8 15.2 -1.6 -3.0 -1.2 4.1 0.5 0.5 
ROW -4.2 -5.8 -6.4 -7.0 -4.8 1.7 7.6 3.2 1.1 
Cons. -20.5 -17.3 -28.4 -18.3 -18.5 .05 .02 .04 -10.7 
Table 6: Carbon Matrix for BTA tax in Annex B at $29/ton CO2. 
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Looking at the upper right-hand block we can also a smaller reduction in 
non-Annex B consumption of carbon imports from Annex B countries (relative to 
the production tax case). This is as expected because the border tax removes the 
tax on these exports from Annex B. The upper-left and lower right-hand blocks 
represent production and consumption internal to each region. With border taxes 
we see slightly lower reductions in emissions in Annex B (for goods consumed in 
Annex B). Emissions from production in non-Annex B consumed locally show a 
mixed pattern, with Chinese emissions going up with border taxes and emissions 
from other regions going down.  
2.4 Robustness/sensitivity/replication 
 A central problem with estimating the size of the effects of a regional 
carbon tax is that we are unsure of many of the central elasticities. As noted, 
elasticities cannot be directly observed; they have to be econometrically 
estimated, and the data that might be used for this estimation is scarce. Because of 
the uncertainty in these parameters, we check the robustness of our results to 
changes in the central elasticities.  
 Another problem with CGE modeling of the problem is that it can be 
difficult to compare CGE results with one another because model structures vary 
in subtle ways and the underlying data and elasticities may be different. To 
respond to this problem, we attempt to replicate the choices of elasticities we find 
in other models. 
 Robustness checks and replication are similar in that in both cases we 
compute results within our model for alternative choices of the central parameters. 
We can perform both activities at the same time by making sure that our 
sensitivity analyses encompass the parameter choices used in other models. We 
present two of our results here.34
 The first sensitivity result we present is the sensitivity of leakage to 
changes in the price elasticity of energy supply, ψES, which as we indicated above 
for the analytic model, we expect to be a central parameter. A low ψES means that 
the supply of energy does not change much when the price changes, while a high 
ψES indicates that supply is highly sensitive to price. We expect leakage to be 
higher when ψES is low. Figure 10 presents these results. 
  
                                                 
34 Addition robustness checks are available at www.rdecep.org . 
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Figure 10: Sensitivity of leakage to ψES for a $29/ton CO2 tax in Annex B, no BTA’s 
 
The left-most two graphs show the change in emissions in Annex B and 
non-Annex B as we change ψES. The vertical difference between the two lines – 
BAU and AB-28 – highlighted in gray is the change in emissions due to the tax 
for various values of ψES. We can see in the left-most graph that the change in 
emissions is quite sensitive to ψES for low values. There is little effect in non-
Annex B regions. The net effect is that leakage is highly sensitive to ψES, 
primarily because of its effect in Annex B. The red dots represent the leakage 
rates and value of ψES used in prior studies.35
The second result we show is an attempt to reproduce as closely as 
possible the full parameter set used in 19 prior studies.
 
36
                                                 
35 For a list of prior studies, see note 37. 
 The parameters that we 
36 Alain Bernard & Marc Vielle, Allocation efficace d’un cout global d’environnement 
entre pays: permis negociables VS taxes ou permis negociables ET taxes?, Economie 
Internationale, CEPII research center, issue 2Q, (2000), pp 103-136; Mustafa H. Babiker, and 
Henry D. Jacoby, Developing country effects of Kyoto-type emissions restrictions, MIT Joint 
program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report No. 53 (1999); Mustafa H. Babiker, 
Climate change policy, market structure, and carbon leakage, 65 Journal of International 
Economics 421-445 (2005); Mustafa H. Babiker, Subglobal climate-change actions and carbon 
leakage: the implication of international capital flows, 23 Energy Economics 121(2001); J. M 
Burniaux, and Martins J. Oliveira, Carbon emission leakage: a general equilibrium view, 
ECO/WKP (2000)15, Paris: OECD; Jean-Marc Burniaux, and Troung P. Truong, GTAP-E, and 
energy-environmental version of GTAP, Technical Paper No. 16 (2002), available at 
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/tech_papers.asp; Johannes Bollen, Ton Manders, and 
Hans Timmers, Decomposing carbon leakage, Third Annual Conference on Global Economic 
Analysis. Melbourne, June 27-30 (2000); Onno J. Kuik and Reyer Gerlagh, Trade Liberalization 
and Carbon Leakage, 24 The Energy Journal 97-120 (2003); Miles Light, Charles Kolstad, and 
Thomas Rutherford, Coal markets and the Kyoto Protocol. Boulder, CO: University of Colorado 
(1999); Warwick J. McKibbin, M.T. Ross, R. Shackleton, and Peter J. Wilcoxen, Emissions 
trading, capital flows and the Kyoto Protocol, The Energy Journal (special issue on the Kyoto 
Protocol), 287-333 (1999); Sergey V. Paltsev, The Kyoto Protocol: regional and sectoral 
contributions to the carbon leakage, 22The Energy Journal, 53-79 (2001); P.M. Bernstein, W. D. 
Montgomery, and Thomas F. Rutherford, Global Impacts of the Kyoto Agreement: Results from 
the MS-MRT Model, Paper presented at the IPCC Working Group III Expert Meeting, May 27-28, 
The Hague, The Netherlands (1999); Reyer Gerlagh & Onno Kuik, Carbon Leakage with 
International Technology Spillovers, Working Papers 2007.33, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
(2007); Everett B. Peterson and Joachim Schleich, Economic and Environmental Effects of  
Border Tax Adjustments, Working paper sustainability and innovation S1/2007 (2007) available at 
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consider include the Armington elasticities, the elasticity of substitution of energy 
goods, and the price elasticity of energy supply. Figure 11 shows the leakage 
reported in prior studies compared to the closest parameter fit within our model. 
We show the full set of estimates in the left-hand graph. In the right-hand graph, 
we eliminate an outlier study. We can explain much of the variation in leakage 
estimates as due to variations in parameters. CIM-EARTH, however, predicts 
higher leakage than the comparison models when using the same parameter set. 
 
Figure 11: replication of parameters in prior models 
 4.5 Proxy tax simulations 
 Border tax adjustments are likely to be difficult to implement. To 
determine the tax on imports, a customs agent would have to know the marginal 
source of energy used for each stage of production for an imported good. A 
finished good may have elements produced in many countries with many different 
                                                                                                                                     
http://econstor.eu/dspace/handle/10419/28514; Steffen Kallbekken, Line S. Flotorp, and Nathan 
Rive, CDM baseline approaches and carbon leakage, 35 Energy Policy 4154-4163 (2007); 
Andreas Loschel, Victoria Alexeeva-Talebi, Tim Mennel, Climate Policy and the Problem of 
Competitiveness: Border Tax Adjustments or Integrated Emission Trading, ZEW Discussion 
Paper 08-061, available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/zewdip/7384.html; Paul Veenendall and 
Ton Manders, Border tax adjustments and the EU-ETS, a quantitative assessment, CPB 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, Document 171 (2008), available at 
http://www.cpb.nl/en/publication/border-tax-adjustment-and-eu-ets-quantitative-assessment; 
Aaditya Mattoo, Arvind Subramanian, Dominique Van der Mensbrugghe, and Jianwu He, 
Reconciling Climate Change and Trade Policy¸ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 
5123 (2009); Niven Winchester, Sergey Palstev and John Reilly, Will Border Carbon Adjustments 
Work, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report No. 184 (2010); 
Warick J. McKibbin and Peter J. Wilcoxen, The Economic and Environmental Effects of Border 
Tax Adjustments for Climate Policy, 2008/2009 Brookings Trade Forum 1-34 (2009). 
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energy sources, making this task difficult. Worse, to give foreign firms the correct 
incentive to use low-carbon production methods, the tax has to be sensitive to the 
particular production choices and energy sources used for each good. For 
example, if the tax rate is based on national averages, individual firms in a given 
country would not have an incentive to switch to low-carbon production as doing 
so would have no effect on the tax imposed and would increase costs. Border tax 
adjustments may also be contrary to WTO law. In particular, the tax would be 
based on production methods and therefore “like” products may face different 
taxes.37
 To address these concerns, we consider three imperfect border tax 
regimes. The first is border tax adjustments based on the average emissions from 
production of a good in the importing country. There are two intuitions behind 
this approach: (1) local customs agents may have better information about 
domestic production methods than about foreign production methods, so it would 
be easier to implement; and (2) it may appeal to domestic industry because it 
imposes the same tax on imports as domestic industry faces. The disadvantage of 
this approach is that the tax is unrelated to the actual emissions from production 
of a good abroad. Foreign firms have no incentive to alter their production in 
response to the tax. In Figures 12 and 13, where we show our results, this tax is 
labeled BTA-Regional. 
 
 The second is a global system of border tax adjustments where the border 
tax and the rebate on export are based on a schedule set by a global entity such as 
the WTO or the UN. The schedule we model is, for each category of goods, equal 
to the global average emissions from the production of those goods. The intuition 
here is that border tax adjustments might be part of a global climate agreement. In 
addition, once negotiated, a schedule would be easy for countries to impose. The 
disadvantages are similar to the disadvantages of border taxes based on domestic 
emissions in the production of like goods. In Figures 12 and 13, this policy is 
labeled BTA-UN. 
 The final imperfect system we consider is import tariffs. These are 
perfectly calculated border taxes but imposed only on imports without the 
corresponding rebate on export. These are punitive, and we imagine them being 
                                                 
37 There is a large literature on the legality of border tax adjustments for carbon taxes and 
cap and trade systems, including Roland Ismer and Karsten Neuhoff, Border tax adjustments: a 
feasible way to support stringent emission trading, 24 European J Law Econ 137 (2007); Gavin 
Goh, The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, 38 
Journal of World Trade 395 (2004). 
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imposed in response to domestic demands by industry fearful of carbon leakage. 
We label this system Tariff.  
 Our results are presented in Figures 12 and 13. Figure 12 shows the global 
emissions reductions under these scenarios, compared to a production tax. 
Comparing the production tax (the top line) to the other taxes, we can see that all 
of the border tax systems reduce emissions more than a pure production tax. The 
reasons are similar to the reasons perfect BTA reduces emissions, as discussed 
above: emissions in Annex B will go up but emissions in non-Annex B regions go 
down by more.  
 
Figure 12: Global emissions reductions under imperfect BTAs. 
Figure 13 shows the leakage rate under each scenario. Perfect border taxes 
reduce leakage the most. The reason is likely that only perfect border taxes 
provide the correct incentives to reduce emissions in foreign production.  
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Figure 13: Leakage rate under tax scenarios; labels the same as Figure 12 
Comparing the tariff lines in Figures 12 and 13, we can see that tariffs 
reduce global emissions in almost exactly the same amounts as perfect BTAs but 
generate more leakage. The difference between a tariff and border tax adjustments 
is that border tax adjustments have a rebate on export while tariffs do not. The 
tariff, by not providing a rebate for exports from Annex B, reduces Annex B 
emissions by more than perfect border taxes, so the denominator in the leakage 
measure is bigger (tending to reduce the leakage rate). Offsetting this effect, 
emissions increases in non-Annex B regions are greater under the tariff than under 
perfect border taxes because there is actually a greater incentive to shift 
production abroad: Annex B production for export to non-Annex B countries is 
not as competitive as local production in non-Annex B countries (for consumption 
there). An exporting Annex B industry therefore may shift production to a non-
Annex B country. The net result is around double the leakage. 
 The UN and regional border tax systems also do not perform as well as 
perfect border taxes. These systems have higher overall emissions and higher 
leakage. The reasons here likely relate to the imperfect incentives these systems 
impose on non-Annex B production. Because the taxes do not respond to 
production choices, there is a lower incentive to alter those choices. We do not 
consider the administrative costs of the alternative systems. If the administrative 
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savings are great enough, it may be worth adopting one of these alternative 
systems notwithstanding their poorer performance.  
5. Conclusions  
We had a number of goals for this study. One was to introduce CGE modeling of 
a legal problem and to consider ways that it can be made useful and accessible. To 
do this, we developed a simplified analytic model of the problem with the same 
core structure as the CGE model. The simplified model provides economic 
intuitions which we then simulate in the CGE model. We parameterized the 
analytic model to match the CGE model so that we could test the sensitivity of the 
analytic model results to the variables we use in the CGE model. We also made 
our CGE code open source, provide extensive sensitivity and robustness checks, 
and attempt to replicate prior studies within our model. While we suspect that 
CGE modeling of legal problems will remain difficult to do and difficult to 
understand for many legal analysts, it may be the best way to study certain classes 
of problems. 
 A second goal was to understand the structure of the leakage problem and 
to understand which parameters drive leakage. One central conclusion in this 
regard is that a key variable is the price elasticity of energy supply. For both 
production taxes and border taxes, a low price elasticity of energy supply means 
that leakage is likely to be high. What really matters for global emissions is the 
total amount of fossil fuels extracted. If energy supply is inelastic, a regional 
carbon tax will have little effect on global extraction. These results show up in 
both our analytic model and in our CGE model. In thinking about the design of 
regional emissions systems, it might be wise to focus on energy supply as much 
as on demand. 
 A third goal was to simulate a variety of tax policies to understand their 
likely effects. Within our CGE model, we consider perfect border taxes and a 
number of imperfect taxes such as a tax based on a global schedule of emissions 
for different types of goods. Our simulations show that imperfect border taxes 
may be significantly inferior at reducing leakage than perfect border taxes. The 
reason appears to relate to the incentives on foreign producers: with imperfect 
taxes they gain no benefit from switching to clean production technologies. Our 
simulations also show the importance of global emissions reductions policies. 
Carbon taxes only in Annex B have limited potential to reduce emissions, and this 
is not a result of leakage. Even without leakage, the large expected increases in 
emissions in the developing world swamp the potential reductions in Annex B.  
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Appendix 
We present below the core equations and parameter values from the analytic 
model.  
Function Form 
Endowments 
(asterisks indicate the foreign country) 
Home: L and E 
Foreign: L* and E* 
Production of l-good * *
l l
l l
Q L
Q L
=
=
 
Energy production in each country  
( )
1
*
1* *
energy
energy
energy
energy
L
Q E
L
Q E
β
β
β
β
β
β
−
−
 
=  
 
 
  
 
 
Trade in energy (M is demand) * *energy energy e eQ Q M M+ = +  
Production of ei-good 
 
( )
*
1
*
1* *
ei
ei e
ei
eei
LQ M
LQ M
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
−
−
 =  
 
 
=  
 
 
Utility 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
*
1* * * *
*
H F H F
H F H F
ei ei l
ei ei l
U C C C
U C C C
α α α α
α α α α
− −
− −
=
=
 
Market clearing 
*
* * *
* * * *
*
*
* *
ei energy l
energy lei
ei ei ei
ei ei ei
l l l l
L L L L
L L L L
Q C C
Q C C
Q Q C C
= + +
= + +
= +
= +
+ = +
 
Parameter Calibrated Value 
Share of income spent on own variety, 
𝛼𝐻 
0.15 
Share of income spent on imported 
variety, 𝛼𝐹  0.07 
Labor share in e-good production, 𝛽 0.74 
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Labor share in ei/ei*-good production, 𝛿 0.80 
Share of labor in H, 𝐿
𝐿𝑤
 0.71 
Share of resource in H, 𝐸
𝐸𝑤
 0.40 
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